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Benefit-cost analysis has been
Maintenance Proposals>:
rley D. Waldo;:::
used most often to investigate the
comparative efficiency of alternative public projects. However, the
benefit- cost technique can be adapted to compare proposals that have
both efficiency and equity objectives. 1/ This paper illustrates the use —
of benefit-cost analysis in evaluating several recent income maintenance
proposals and suggests a modification that will help to lessen the conflict
between objectives that is inherent to all income maintenance plans.
~/ For differing views on the use of benefit-cost analysis in evaluating
programs that combine efficiency and equity objectives, see the following:
A. Maass, “Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public Investment
Decisions, “ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80 (May 1966), pp. 208-
226; R. H. Haveman, “Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public
Investment Decisions: Comment, “ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 81
(November 1967), pp. 695-702; S. A. Marglin, “Objectives of Water
Resource Development: A General Statement, “ in Design of water Re-
source Systems, ed. by A. Maass et al. (Cambridge: Harvard I.University
Press, 1962), pp. 62-87; B. A. Weisbrod, “Income Redistribution Effects
and Benefit-Cost Analysis, “ in Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis,
ed. by S. B. Chase (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1968),
pp. 177-213; R. J. Kalter and T. H. Stevens, “Resource Investments,
Impact Distribution, and Evaluation Concepts, “ American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, 53 (May 1971), pp. 206-216; A. M. Freeman,
“Income Distribution and Planning for Public Investment, “ American
Economic Review, 57 (June 1967), pp. 495-508; and R. A. Musgrave,
“Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Theory of Public Finance, “ Journal
of Economic Liter~ture, 7 (Septembe~ 1969), pp. 803-805.-2-
Income Maintenance Proposals
In 1970 there were an estimated 25.5 million poor who had an
aggregate deficit of $11.4 billion between their earnings from all sources
and the poverty income threshold. The public assistance system was
approaching complete collapse in the late 1960’s as welfare rolls increased
rapidly. From 1960 to 1970, the number of recipients in the four major
public assistance programs increased from 5.9 to 10.2 million. The re-
sulting fiscal crunch on local and state governments was especially
dramatic in the major metropolitan areas. Moreover, there was increasing
dissatisfaction with the inequities of public assistance between states and
between categories of the poor (the latter particularly because of the
exclusion of the working poor).
A series of proposals have been made to reform the welfare transfer
payment system. Most of these programs involve some variation of a
non- categorical income maintenance plan. A pure non-categorical income
maintenance program would make family income the only criteria for
program participation, with the primary objective being to reduce the
poverty deficit.
One solution t? poverty is simply to provide the poor with sufficient
income to raise them to a socially defined minimum acceptable income
level (the pove:rty threshold). To minimize program cost, the poor could
be raised to their poverty threshold income and any additional earnings
taxed away through an offsetting reduction in benefits (in essence, a 100--3-
percent tax on additional earnings). This Minimum Cost- Total Eradication
proposal would remove all of poverty, but it would create incentive
problems. 2 / To encourage employment, most income maintenance —
proposals reduce the grant by less
ings. For example, the Heineman
than $1 for every $1 of additional earn-
Commission proposal calls for a basic
grant of $750 for adults and $450 for children with a reduction in benefits
equal to 50 percent of other income. The Family Assistance Plan (FAP)
provides a basic grant of $500 for adults and $300 for children with a 50
percent tax on earnings in excess of $720 per year.
Comparison of the Minimum Cost-Total Eradication proposal, the
Heineman Commission proposal, and the Family Assistance Plan is in-
structive. The three proposals are illustrated graphically in figures 1,
2, and 3. A good income maintenance program may be defined as one
that:
2/ The Minimum-Cost-Total Eradication proposal is seriously advanced
~y almost no one due to the disadvantage of the 100 percent tax rate. It
does represent the approach taken until. recently in public assistance pay-
ments. Very high marginal tax rates enable a maximum of program
coverage for minimal program cost. Past public assistance programs
have not been as concerned with maintaining work incentives as with
providing basic income support to the destitute. This approach was
modified in 1!367 by the amendment to the Social Security Act in which
marginal tax rates faced by AFDC recipients were reduced to zero for
the first $360 of earned income and 66 2/3 percent for the rest of earned
income. Ileductions from taxable income for work related expenses were
also allowed.
In 1968 President Johnson appointed a Commission on Income Main-










































Figure 3. Family Assistance Plan (family of four)-7-
1. Removes a large part of the poverty gap;
2, Minimizes payments to the non-poor and payments that raise
the income of the poor above the poverty threshold; and
3. Maintains incentives for the poor to retain and seek employment.
Few persons seriously advocate the Minimum Cost-Total Er adication
plan because it fails to maintain work incentives. The Heineman Commis-
sion and FAP proposals do provide work incentives, but neither plan closes
all of the poverty gap and both make payments to the non-poor. 3 / ‘l’he —
issued its report in November 1969 in which it advocated the proposal
described in figure 2. Meanwhile, President Nixon upstaged the commission
with his speech of August 11, 1969, in which he proposed the Family Assis-
tance Plan described in figure 3. This proposal evolved from the pre -
inaugural Nixon Task Force on Public Welfare, the Ryan -Lyday bill, and
the Moynihan Urban Affairs Council. The Task Force merely provided
some cost estimates for a reform of the public assistance system that had
been proposed by the Advisory Council on Public Welfare in June 1966.
The Ryan bill of May 1968 broke decisively with this reform approach by
introducing an income maintenance proposal. This rejection of incremental
reform was also reflected in the Family Assistance Plan. See G. Y.
Steiner, The State of Welfare, (Washington: The Brookings Institution,
1971), pp. 110-121.
3 / It should be noted that the Heineman Commission proposal covers
~oth families and unrelated individuals, while the FAP proposal is still.
a categorical program because it includes only poor families with children
(under 21 if in school, otherwise under 18). This characteristic of the
proposal does not affect our analysis; however the FAP proposal will
have no impact on poor unrelated individuals, whose aggregate movement
out of poverty has been unaffected by economic growth, anti-poverty pro-
grams, and improvements in transfer programs over the past decade.
From 1960 to 1970 the number of poor in families declined 41 percent
while the number of poor unrelated individuals increased by 2 percent.
1+’ailure to help this group move out of poverty primarily reflects the
inadequacy of categorical transfer programs for the aged. The aged
over 64 comprise 54 percent of the poor unrelated individuals. See-8-
unfilled protion of the poverty deficit is represented by 13DE in figure 2
and BDHE in figure 3. In both figures, payments to the poor in excess of
the poverty threshold are represented by EFG and payments to the non-
poor by CFG.
Evaluation of Three Proposals
The benefit-cost ratio technique can be adapted to help resolve
conflicts between the objectives of income maintenance programs. In this
analysis, benefits are defined as all income transferred to the poor in a
given year. The calculation of benefits excludes income transferred tc)
the non-poor and that part of income transferred to the poor that raises
their total income above the poverty threshold. Costs are defined as the
value of the reduced labor supply resulting from the program plus the
total income transfer in a given year. Thus, the benefit-cost ratio will
always be less than one. This ratio is only a device for calculating a
measurement with which proposals can be compared and has no absolute
meaning. In particular, it does not imply that a dollar’s worth of resources
will result in less than a dollar’s worth of output.
The most difficult problem is to estimate the expected reduction
in the labor supply. It is possible to make an estimate of the labor supply
effect of various income maintenance proposals based on the results of a
U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60,
No. 77, “Poverty Increases by 1.2 million in 1970, “ (Washington: U. S.




financed by the Heineman Commission. In this study, Green and
estimated that an income maintenance proposal with a $1, 500 basic
and a 50 percent tax rate would result in a reduced labor supply
valued at approximately t$l. 2 billion in 1964. 4/ lf aged persons in male- —
headed families and female-headed families are excluded, the value of
the output loss is reduced to $690 million.
Our estimates of the labor supply effect of the Minimum Cost-
‘rotal Eradication proposal, the Heineman Commission proposal, and the
FAP proposal are presented in table 1. To estimate the labor supply
reduction of the Heineman Commission and the FAP proposals, a constant
4/ C. Green and A. Tells, “Effect of Non-employment Income and
Wage Rates on the Work Incentives of the Poor, “ The Review of Economics
and Statistics, 51 (November 1969), pp. 399-408. The study estimated
a family labor supply reduction of 11.5 percent for persons in non-aged
male-headed families.
Preliminary results from the New Jersey income maintenance experi-
ment indicate that their experimental group worked 12 percent fewer hours
than their control group. However, for the experimental group receiving
income maintenance payments, total earnings were not significantly lower
because workers in the experimental group were able to obtain a higher
hourly wage than workers in the control group. Apparently, transfer pay-
ments are an investment enabling recipients to spend more time in job
search, and the wage differential may indicate the return to increased job
search. Sixty percent of the difference between the experimental group
and the control group in number of hours worked by the family was due to
the employment behavior of the wife and other family workers. Secondary
workers may be moving into and out of the labor force to help attain a
minimum family income goal.. This minimum income goal may shift up-
ward over time, thereby reducing the long-run labor supply reduction of
secondary workers. See U. S. Office of Economic Opportunity, Further
“Preliminary Results of the New Jersey Graduated Work Incentive Expe~i -
ment, OEO Pamphlet 3400-4 (May 1971), pp. 20-22.-1o-
Table 1. Estimated Value of Labor Supply Reduction for Various
Income Maintenance Proposals (in millions of dollars)
13asic grant for a Males Male and female
family of four a/ under heads of families —
age 65 and unrelated
individuals
$l,500Q/
$1, 960 (FAP) ~/





d/ 6.270 e/ 8,130 — —
a/ All of the proposals except the Minimum Cost-Total Eradication
prol~osal incl ude a 50 percent tax rate.
b/ Estimates from C. Green and A. Tel]a, “Effect of Nonemployment
Into–me and Wage Rates on the Work Incentives of the Poor”, The Review
of Economics and Statistics, 51 (November 1969), pp. 407-408.
—
c/ The basic grant is $1, 960 if the provision to allow $720 per year
for ~mployment costs is ignored. The resulting benefit- cost ratio is
not very sensitive to this adjustment. If the lower bound of the labor
supply reduction is estimated by treating this proposal as having a basic
grant of $1, 600 with a 50 percent tax rate, ignoring the zero tax rate
on the first $720, the benefit-cost ratio is increased by only O. 05. This
does not change the ranking of the various proposals, and the first assump -
ti~n appears to be more realistic.
d/ It is assumed that all of the poor cease employment after imple -
men~ation of the program. Those earning more than poverty incomes
who opt to cease work and take the grant are not included. No discount
is made for those who prefer work to leisure at a zero wage ‘rate.
e/ Also includes female unrelated individuals under age 65. —-11-
disincentive effect to scale is assumed. The assumption is that doubling
the basic grant of an income maintenance proposal while retaining the
same tax rate will double the value of production lost through a reduction
in the labor supply. One further adjustment is necessary to obtain an
estimate for the FAP proposal. The first $720 earned annually by FAP
recipients is not taxed because $60 per month is allowed for working
expenses. If this provision is ignored, the 17AP proposal is reduced
to a proposal with a basic grant of $1, 960 and a proportionate tax of
50 percent on all wage earnings. The value of the labor supply reduction
then can be approximated from the Green-Tells estimates. This pro-
cedure will slightly overstate the labor supply reduction due to the lack
of disincentive effect of the FAP proposal for the first $720 of earnings.
The Minimum Cost-Total Eradication proposal can be viewed as
a subsidy that encourages a reduced labor supply. For each dollar’s
worth of reduced earnings, the 100-percent tax rate results in a transfer
of a dollar to the poor recipient, If it is assumed that all of the poor
prefer leisure to work at a zero or negative wage rate, the economically
rational response is for all of the poor to cease wage employment. Wage
earnings for the poor in 1969 were estimated to be $8. 1 billion. 5/ —
5/ All families in poverty received $10.6 billion in income in 1969;
S2 percent, or $5. 5 billion, of this amount was from earnings. In 1969,
one-fifth of the poor (4, 851, 000 persons) were unrelated individuals.
The poverty income threshold for a single individual in 1969 was $1, 834.
Thus, the total income necessary to lift all unrelated individuals to the-12-
Depending upon their evaluation of work, leisure, and income, some of
those only a little above the poverty threshold might opt to take the grant
and cease work. However, some of the poor would undoubtedly prefer
work even at a zero or negative wage rate. We assume that the under-
estimation of labor supply reduction resulting from not taking into account
the near-poor who cease employment because of the program would be
approximately offset by the overestimation resulting from the assump -
tion that all of the poor would cease work and take the
poverty threshold was $8.9 billion. The mean income
related individuals was $777, or $3.8 billion in total.




was $5. 1 billion.
If 52 percent of this income was derived from labor earnings, as is true
for all family income, then the labor earnings of poor unrelated individuals
were $2. 6 billion. Consequently, the total labor earnings of the poor in
1969 were $8.1 billion.
In 1969, families headed by females earned 33 percent of their total
income of $1.2 billion from labor. There were 980, 000 heads of male
households over age 65. If it is assumed that these individuals earned
only one-third less than the average income for families with male heads,
then the value of their per capita labor income was $911. In 1967, 27
percent of all males over 65 participated in the labor force. The total
value of the labor supply of male family heads 65 and over, assuming
that 27 percent worked, was $242 million. It is assumed that unrelated
individuals over 65 can also earn $911 in per capita income. Fifty-five
percent of the unrelated individuals are 65 and over. In 1967, 17 percent
of all over 65 worked. If 17 percent of the 2.66 million over 65 earned
the group mean wage earnings of !$911, then unrelated individuals over
65 earned $417 million. Summing the wage earnings of female family
heads and the two aged categories gives $1.86 billion.
The data for these calculations were taken from the [J. S. Bureau
of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 76 (Decem-
ber 1970), pp. 6, 10, 18, 52, and 82. The rates of participation in the
labor force of the aged were taken from J. A. Pechman, H. J. Aaron,
and M. K. Taussig, Social Security: Perspectives for Reform (Washington:
The Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 9.-13-
Under the Minimum Cost-Total Eradication proposal, no payments
are made to the non-poor and none of the poor receive payments that
raise their total income above the poverty threshold. Under the Heineman
Commission and FAP proposals, there is some leakage to the non-poor.
Payments to the non-poor can be estimated by finding the area of CEG
(shown in figures 2 and 3) as a proportion of the area that represents
total transfer payments. Using integral
equal to 10 percent of total payments for
proposal (figure 2). Half of the leakage ,
calculus, the area of CEG is
the Heinernan Commission
goes to the non-poor and the
other half raises some of the poor above the poverty threshold. If the
net transfer of the Heineman program is $5. 9 billion,
will be paid to the non-poor. 6/ In the FAP proposal —




The other necessary assumption is that family incomes are equally dis-
tributed from zero to $4, 800. Obviously, the family income of the poor
would be expected to bunch around the poverty threshold.
The Heineman Commission estimated a higher leakage of $1.5
billion to the non-poor based on a poverty threshold of $3, 553 for a non-
farrn family of four. Their estimate was based upon a more thorough
analy,sis of present family incomes and family sizes than our rough esti-
mate. The largest poverty deficits are for the poor with large families;
hence this under-estimation based on the assumption of four-person
families is not surprising. However, the extent of this bias is surprising
and may indicate the need for special attention to the particular require-
ments of large families in poverty. It may also indicate a high return in
long-run poverty reduction to subsidized family planning programs. In
1969 there were 1.1 million families in poverty with four or more chil-
dren under 18.-14-
break-even point of $3, 920 is very close to the weighted average poverty
threshold in 1969 for a family of four, which was $3, 721. Consequently,
lea kage to the non-poor is very small, only O. 5 percent of the total
transfers under the FAP proposal go to the non-poor. If the addition
in net transfers under F’AP is $2.5 billion, then payments to the non-
poor are only $13.3 million.
The benefit-cost ratio for the three proposals can be calculated
from the information summarized in table 2. The ratio is net program
costs minus transfers to the non-poor divided by net program cost plus
the value of the labor supply reduction. The benefit- cost ratio of the
Minimum Cost-Total Eradication proposal is O. 55. This proposal closes
all of the poverty gap and makes no payments to the non-poor, but the
disincentive effect is so large that it substantially reduces the benefit-
cost ratio. The benefit-cost ratio of the FAP proposal is O. 61, Only
O. 5 percent of the payments under this proposal would go to the non-poor,
but FAP would close only 22 percent of the poverty gap. The Heineman
Commission proposal has the most favorable benefit-cost ratio, O. 68.
This proposal would close 47 percent of the poverty gap with about 10
percent of the payments going to the non-poor.
This is, of course, only a partial and somewhat crude analysis
of the benefits and costs of income maintenance programs. More precise
knowledge of the labor supply effects of income maintenance programs is
badly needed. And attention should be directed toward measuring some of-15-
Table 2. Comparison of Three Income Maintenance Proposals a/ —
Minimum Cost- Heineman
Total Eradication Commission FAP
proposal proposal proposal
Percentage of poverty gap
closed
Estimated value of labor
supply reduction (bil. dol. )
Estimated payments to the
non-poor (roil. dol. ) b/ —
Percentage of payments to
the non-poor
13enefit-cost ratio








. 55 .68 .61
11.4 5.9 2.5
25.5 36.8 20.0
Not specified Surtax of Surtax of
approxi- approxi-
mately 12% e/mately —
2. 5T0 el .
a/ The table is based on the expenditure estimates of the original
pro~osals and data on poverty in 1970 from U. S. Bureau of the Census,
Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 77 (May 7, 1971).
b/ Also includes payments to the poor raising them above the poverty
def i=ition. Exactly one-half of the leakages go to each category.
c/ These program costs only include net increases in transfer pay-
menls. No additional expenditures for supportive services, such as day-
care centers, were included in these costs. The Heineman Commission
proposal assumes that another $1 billion of federal funds would substitute




The FAP proposal also includes some reduced effort by
states and local areas, but this reduction of less than $0. 5 billion is
not included in the $2. 5 billion estimate. The estimated total cost of
the FAI? proposal is $4.4 billion.
d/ The Minimum Cost-Total Eradication proposal pays benefits
onl~ to the poor, whereas the other two programs also make payments
to the non-poor. For the estimate of program beneficiaries of the
Heineman Commission proposal, see the report of the President’s
Commission on Income Maintenance Programs, Poverty Amid Plenty:
The American Paradox (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office,
November 1969), p. 61. The estimate of the coverage of the FAP proposal
was made by W. Michael Mahoney, Office of Planning and Evaluation,
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, February 1970.
e/ The Surtax would be put on all personal and corporate income.
The–l~AP proposal would also eliminate the federal contribution to AFDC.
The ~Teineman Commission proposal would not only eliminate the federal.
contribution to all categoric~l assistance programs but also eliminate
food stamps. See R. J. I,ampman, “Transfer Approaches to Distribu-
tion Policy, “ American Economic Review, 60 (May 1970), p. 277. Using
$3, 000 as the household poverty threshold, Lampman estimated a net
increase in payments to the poor of $5. 6 billion from the Heineman
Commission proposal and $1.8 billion from FAP. Ollr analysis does not
consider the problem of integrating a new program into the present sys-
tem. If we use Lampman’s estimates of leakage to the non-poor and
total program costs, and our estimates of labor supply reduction, the
benefit-cost ratio is still higher for the Heineman Commission proposal
than for the FAP proposal.-17-
the potential benefits of income maintenance programs that are not
included here. For example, an income mainten:~ncc program would
be valllal)le in supplemcnii.n~ unemployment compensation as an automatic
stabilizer of economic fluctuations. Federally financed income maintenance
\vould help relieve the fiscal crisis confronting man,y state and local govern-
ments. Still another benefit would be the dynamic effects of making it
possible for the poor to increase their investment in themselves and
their children.
The Case for a Regressive Income Maintenance Plan
The principal objectives of an income maintenance program are
to reduce the poverty deficit and to maintain the incentive of the poor to
work while minimizing or eliminating transfers to the non-poor. There
is a modification of the simple constant-rate (proportional) tax feature of
the Heineman Commission proposal that offers several advantages in
resolving the conflicts between these objectives.
The United States has a progressive personal income tax system.
The positive tax schedule, which begins for a family of four at an income
of $3, 600 in 1971, provides increasing marginal tax rates as income
levels rise. This same prinaiple can be applied to an income maintenance
system by providing increasing marginal tax rates as income falls below
the amount at which positive taxes apply, thereby imposing a regressive
rate structure on grant recipients. To illustrate the advantages of a
regressive income maintenance plan, consider this question: what is-18-
the optimal income maintenance program if the main objective is to
reduce the poverty deficit of $11.4 billion and program outlays must
be restricted to, say, $5 billion?
The program strategy is obvious: Cre ate a step-wise variation
in marginal tax rates to spend $5 billion entirely on closing the poverty
deficit. For example, the marginal tax rate might be 65 percent on
earnings from $0 to $1, 500; 50 percent on earnings from $1, 500 to $2, 500;
and 35 percent on earnings from $2, 500 to $3, 650 (see figure 4). This
program would concentrate on providing maximun incentive for the
poor to seek and retain full-time employment. Tax rates would be
highest for the very poor and lowest for those whose earnings are near
the poverty threshold. 7 / —
A system of regressive tax rates would tend to discourage the
very poor from accepting part-time, seasonal, or low-paying jobs.
But it would offer less disincentive for the acceptance of full-time and
better paying jobs.
system of tax rates
Once an individual enters the labor force, this
encourages full-time employment.
A regressive income maintenance program is diametrically
7 / The Seattle experiment of income maintenance programs will include
= regressive treatment as proposed here. A declining rate schedule will
also facilitate the merging of the negative tax rates with the positive tax
schedule. See M. Kurz and R. G. Spiegelman, “The Seattle Experiment:
The Combined Effect of Income Maintenance and Manpower Investments, “








o $1,500 $2,500 $3,600
/
Income before transfer
Figure 4. A Regressive Income Maintenance Proposal (family of four)-20-
opposite to the FAP proposal, which includes a progressive rate struc-
ture. The FAP proposal sets a zero tax rate on the first $720 of annual
earnings and a 50 percent rate on annual earnings in excess of $720.
Moreover, when combined with other programs such as food stamps
and medical insurance, the administration’s welfare package results
in extremely high marginal tax rates that increase as the poverty threshold
is approached. This occurs because of the attempt to phase out all cash
and in-kind assistance programs as individuals move out of poverty.
Estimates of the marginal tax rates that would be faced by
recipients of FAP, food stamps, and medical insurance indicate that
rates are highest for families with gross earnings of from $720 to $4, 240,
reaching !30 percent for those with earnings of from $3, 800 to $3, 920
(see table 3). Rates are substantially lower for very low incomes and
for incomes above $4, 240. Thus, the disincentive to supplement transfer
payments with wage earnings is greatest for the working poor whose
before transfer income is close to the poverty threshold. A transfer
system with progressive tax rates would be expected to encourage part-
time rather than full-time employment unless full-time employment pays
enough to move the individual above the range of high marginal tax rates.
If the potential reduction in the labor supply of recipients is an
important concern in the design of an income maintenance program it
makes more sense to impose lower tax rates on the working poor than
on the non-working poor. Since the gross earnings of the working poor-21-
Table 3. Marginal Percentage Tax Rates Faced by Recipients
of FAP, Food Sta reps, and Medical Insurance
Gross earnings Marginal tax rate a/ —
$ ()-$ 7~o 42
720 - 2, 080 74
~, 080 - 3, 800” ’76
3, 800 - 3, 920 90
3, 920 - 4, 240 61
4, 240 - 4, 500 29
q/ These rates are for a family of four and include social security
taxes and the positive personal income tax schedule. It is assumed that
the latter become operative at an income of $3, 800 (allowing four exemp-
tions of $700 and a $1, 000 standard deduction). This accounts for the
difference of 14 percentage points between $2, 080 - $3, 800 category and
the $3,800 - $3, 920 category.
Source: D. L. Bowden, G. C. Cain, and L. J. Hausman, “The
Family Assistance Plan: An Analysis and Evaluation, “ (Madison,
Wisconsin: Institute for Research on Poverty) unpublished paper,
January 1971, p. 12.-22-
will hover around the poverty line,
food stamps and medical insurance
the elimination of food stamps, the
reform bill (H. R. 1)
the basic prc]blem of
passed by the
a progressive
the FAP proposal combined with
has the opposite effect. Even with
modification of FAP in the welfare
House in May 1971 does not resolve
income maintenance proposal. The
House bill attempts to deal with the problem of labor supply reduction
by providing a separate program for those considered “capable” of
working. However, the bill does not resolve the incentive problem
since it provides a tax rate of 66 2/3 percent on income in excess of
$720 annually.
A regressive income maintenance proposal would impose high
marginal. rates on those with very low earnings whose labor supply
elasticity is expected to be very low due to age, disability, or in the
case of female-headed families,
vel-y low labor supply elasticity
supply reduction even with high
Moreover, a regressive income maintenance program would still
large family s,
for this group,
ze. 8/ Because of the .—
the value of the labor
marginal tax rates will be minimal.
8/ “Sixty-one percent of poor male family heads and 43 percent of poor
~emale family heads worked in 1969. About 90 percent of poor male heads
who did not work were either ill or disabled or can be presumed to be
retired. About 72 percent of poor female heads who did not work gave
family and home responsibilities as their main reason for not working in
1969. “ (J. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series
.P-60, No. 76 (December 1970), p. 2. Also see C. L. Schultze et al. ,
Setting National Priorities: The 1972 Budget (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1971, pp. 180-190.-23-
rnaintain an incentive for those with very low earnings to seek full-time
employment. It also would avoid arbitrary determination of who is
capable of working and simplify program administration, thereby
reducing administrative costs.
Conclusions
The benefit-cost ratio technique can be used to evaluate more




The results woLdd be expected to be sensitive to estimates
supply reduction effect. Improved data on this effect will
from the present field experiments of income maintenance
programs in New Jersey, Seattle, Gary, North Carolina, and Iowa. 9 / —
Better estimates of program leakage can be obtained. by more detailed
examination of family size and present earnings of the poor and eligible
non-poor. Our objective was to demonstrate the technique rather than
to provide a definitive analysis.
9 / The preliminary results of the New Jersey experiment in income
&aintenance show no statistically significant differences in labor supply
response between categories of recipients whose marginal tax rates
were 30, 50, and 70 percent. See H. W. Watts, “Adjusted and Extended
Preliminary Results from the Graduated Work Incentive Experiment, “
Discussion Paper (Madison: University of Wisconsin, Institute for Research
on Poverty, June 1970), pp. 25-27.
One of the primary problems in the new Jersey experiment was that
program recipients did not completely understand the mechanics of the
program, especially the tax rates, even though program details were
explained to them. It is not clear that the new Seattle program, with its
even more complicated system of tax rates, will be able to overcome
this problem of incomplete comprehension. See 11. W. Watts, “The
C,raduated Work Incentive Experiments: Current Progress, “ American
Economic Review, 61 (May 1971), pp. 20-21.-24-
The primary theoretical problem in designing an income
maintenance program lies in determining the appropriate trade-off between
three conflicting objectives: reduction of the poverty deficit, maintenance
of work incentives, and avoidance of transfers to the non-poor. The
graphical approach and the benefit-cost ratio technique focus on this
problem. This analysis suggests that a regressive income maintenance
program is superior to one in which tax rates are progressive (FAP) or
proportionate (the Heinernan Commission proposal). For a given level
of program expenditure, a regressive tax schedule maximizes the amount
of the poverty deficit that is closed. Moreover, a regressive income
maintenance program would provide lower marginal tax rates for those
with incomes near the poverty threshold, thereby encouraging the
acceptance of full-time employment by the very poor and discouraging
a reduction in work effort by those near the poverty threshold.